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Abstract
Forensic analysis of logs is one responsibility of an
enterprise cyber defense team; inherently, this is a big
data task with thousands of events possibly logged in
minutes of activity. Logged events range from
authorized users typing incorrect passwords to
malignant threats. Log analysis is necessary to
understand current threats, be proactive against
emerging threats, and develop new firewall rules. This
paper describes embedded analytics for log analysis,
which incorporates five mechanisms: numerical,
similarity, graph-based, graphical analysis, and
interactive feedback. Topological Data Analysis (TDA)
is introduced for log analysis with TDA providing novel
graph-based similarity understanding of threats which
additionally enables a feedback mechanism to further
analyze log files. Using real-world firewall log data
from an enterprise-level organization, our end-to-end
evaluation shows the effective detection and
interpretation of log anomalies via the proposed
process, many of which would have otherwise been
missed by traditional means.

1. Introduction
e-Government cyber systems are enterprise level
systems which encompass a variety of devices and
standards due to the myriad of e-Government services
offered. Additionally, these system are expected to be
both secure and reliable in operations, accounting for
and responding to a variety of cyber events [1] [2].
Enterprise cyber systems are all encompassing, which
monitor and control access for any device that may use
the network, from computers to Internet-of-Things
(IoT) devices. Additionally, due to their scale and the
sensitivity of the data and operations they support,
enterprise cyber security involves many layers and
efforts, such as encompasses multiple, very large local
networks, which have their own devices, standards, and
administration. Enterprise cyber security often includes
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forensics analysis and security or data fusion centers to
detect emerging threats [3] [4].
Firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention
systems (IDPS) are one line of defense in securing
networks by identifying and stopping suspicious
network traffic. These systems operate by evaluating
traffic against rules to: 1) evaluate event type (e.g.,
invalid user password), 2) consider predicates on event
attributes, (such as “user failed 3 times”), and 3) trigger
actions if both the incoming traffic matches a particular
type and the predicates are satisfied [5]. Rules can refer
to specific IP addresses to block or be sophisticated and
evaluate multiple events over a time period [6]. When
rules are triggered by a suspicious event, firewalls and
IDPS devices save the event as an entry in a log file with
details of what preprogrammed rules were violated and
how the event was handled [7]. While containing a lot
of useful information, log files do not contain the packet
data itself that led to a particular event. Thus, analysis is
on contextual data while analysis of the transmitted data
itself, as in [8], is not generally possible.
Logs from enterprise-level organizations can include
thousands of events per second and millions per day [9].
This is expected to grow with increasing use of IoT
endpoints [9]. Log files are one digital forensics data
source to understand threats and discover new and
emerging threats; however, log files analysis is often
neglected in cyber security [9]. Since enterprise level
cyber systems must provide accountability and look for
emerging threats, cyber forensics of firewall and IDPS
logs is a useful component of any enterprise-level cyber
security operations [10]. However, the unstructuredness of cyber logs in enterprises results in significant
manual analysis for cyber forensics [3] [10].
The goal of this application is to improve general
firewall digital forensics at the enterprise level through
advanced analytical methods. Current approaches limit
discovery by providing only an instance of results based
on a given query. To remedy this, the authors present the
application of topological data analysis (TDA) to log
files, through which a feedback approach can be used
for further analysis with descriptive/predictive statistics,
and visualizations. TDA is an advanced numerical,
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Figure 1. Generic representation of an enterprise-level data collection hierarchy, from [3].
graph-based, and visual analytics approach that
simultaneously considers similarity and shape of the
data [11].
While TDA has been proposed for cyber network
analysis [12] [13] [14], it has yet to be applied for
firewall logs. The closest application of TDA to log
analysis is that of Chow [15], who applied TDA to
Windows event logs from the BRAWL (Blue versus
Red Agent War-game Evaluation) project. However, the
work in [15] considered synthetic cyber data, a
constrained and experimental environment, and could
not find direct value in applying TDA to cyber data.
Additionally, Coudriau et al. [14] applied TDA to
network address data, but the data was not high in
variety as typically found in logs. This paper thus
illustrates the first application of TDA to real-world
collected firewall logs from a large enterprise system, as
well as the incorporation of TDA into a big data
analytics platform for batch analysis of cyber logs.
Beyond these contributions, the results also address the
limitations of using TDA mentioned in [15].
Analytics by themselves can be brittle; of interest in
this paper is proposing and employing a combined
experiential and analytical approach to log forensics
through the data-driven, user-friendly embedded
analytics platform. Herein, statistical and visual
methods are combined into an embedded application.
For this, the authors leverage their past work [3] in cyber
analytics and employ a tabulated feature vector (TFV)
approach to process log files and identify anomalies. In
the TFV approach, log files are divided into temporal
blocks and analysts are cued to blocks of interest. TDA
extends this by looking at similarity across blocks, in
addition to a further feedback loop process. The key
contributions from this paper are:
• The first application of TDA to log analysis
• Development of a human-machine approach that is
simultaneously
temporal,
similarity,
and
statistically-based that incorporates feedback

•
•

Combination of statistical and visual methods for
outlier/anomaly detection and interpretation
An evaluation of the developed approach on real
enterprise log files on data consistent with [3].

2. Background
Big data, such as network traffic, can be processed
as batches or streams. Batches are collected and then
processed whereas streams are analyzed in real-time or
near real-time [16]. Firewalls and IDPS systems
consider streaming data wherein rules are applied to
network traffic [6]. In contrast, digital forensics
considers aggregated data in a batch process to find
threats and develop new firewall/IDPS rules [17].
A general enterprise level data collection approach
is conceptualized in Figure 1. At enterprise systems, raw
logs are normalized into a structured file at a given
facility, then forwarded to a Regional Center (RC)
which both collects data and defends against cyber
threats [18]. At the RCs, a regional Security Information
and Event Management (SIEM) device aggregates,
correlates, monitors and generates alerts from the
received data. Data is then sent and aggregated from
multiple regional SIEMs and sent to a global SIEM. The
global SIEM then connects to cyber analysis.
In Figure 1, the big data platform can be considered
as a centralized database for managing and analyzing
big data [3]. Here, both structured and unstructured data
is collected with high volume, variety, and velocity, the
3 V’s [19], from which data can be queried and
analyzed. Of interest is looking for understanding and
interpretation of events that would have triggered a log
entry; such understanding can be gained by developing
embedded analytics methods that analysts can run to
analyze log files and provide interpretations.

2.1. Cyber Forensics Analytics
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Fundamental to statistical data analysis, colloquially
known as analytics, is the use of algorithms to find
patterns [20]. Analytics methods range from supervised,
with known classes/groups in the data (e.g. malignant
and benign), to unsupervised, where classes/groups are
unknown and need to be discovered (e.g. discovery of
new groupings). Supervised analytics in cyber could
include determining how similar observations are to
known threats based on classifier algorithms.
Unsupervised analytics, e.g. clustering, are especially
relevant in cyber since the dynamic nature of cyber
events means new threats are constantly emerging.
Problematically, normal behavior for cyber
networks constantly changes and conservative
approaches are often pursued which yield secure
systems with high false positive detection rates [21].
Such systems could hamper authorized use of networks,
furthering the importance of identifying actual threats.
In analyzing log files, one is essentially interested in 1)
detecting the anomalies within the anomalies, and 2)
finding emerging threats via forensic analysis.
Two general approaches exist for cyber log forensics
analytics: experiential/qualitative and analytical/
quantitative. Experiential cyber log forensics uses cyber
analysts who rely on manual sorting and experientially
gained knowledge to find possible threats for further
investigation [3]. Such approaches are heavily effective
and make use of the innate ability of humans to process
large amounts of complex data [20]; however, big data
challenges make it impossible to analyze all data
effectively and novice analysts might miss events that
veteran analysts would not [22]. Additional issues
include the asymmetrical nature of cyber-attacks where
attackers can focus on one approach while defenders
must protect all systems from many different types of
attacks, vulnerabilities, and threats [23].
To solve this problem, various analytical methods
have been proposed to analyze logs [24]. Log analytics
methods include both high level approaches, such as
anomaly detection [25] [26], text analytics [27],
dynamic rule creation [28], and event correlation [24],
to the application of specific algorithms such as support
vector machines [29], random forests [30], principal
component analysis (PCA) and factor analysis (FA) [3].
However, analytics by themselves can be brittle. Of
interest in this paper is proposing and employing a
combined experiential and analytical approach to log
forensics through a data driven embedded application.

2.2. Big Cyber Log Data
Due to the large size of enterprise networks and
quantity of users, the data is of significant volume and
emerging at high velocity; i.e. a big data problem. With
a wide variety of devices at use in enterprise networks,

each observation to the log can be highly variable from
the others with the some logged fields being sparse due
to differing approaches used at Regional SIEMs.
Traditionally, analysts employed experiential
approaches to digital forensics where large log files are
manually sorted to find anomalies to further investigate.
However, inspecting numerous potential incidents on a
daily basis is not scalable. The work in [3] extended the
manual process to develop an embedded analytics tool
that examines an entire log file and provides tools to find
novelty, anomalies, and contextual meaning in a log.
Notably, the authors in [31] recently proposed a similar
process to that of [3]. Herein, we extend upon [3] with
more advanced analytics as well as a feedback approach.
Due to sparsity, this research focuses on a reduced
set of collected log fields, listed in Table 3. These fields
were selected based on i) commonality between data
fields logged by Regional SIEMS and ii) demonstrating
statistical approaches to log file analysis without
incorporating text mining techniques. Redundant fields
from Regional SIEMs, e.g. Device_Vendor and
Device_Product, were also grouped avoid confusion.
Table 3. Dataset Variables
Field Name
Device Vendor
Device Product
Source Address
Destination Address
Transport Protocol
Bytes In
Bytes Out
Category Outcome
Country_Name

Description
Company who made the device
Name of the security device
IP address of the source
IP address of the destination
Transport protocol used
Number of bytes transferred in
Number of bytes transferred out
Action taken by the device
Country of the source IP address

2.3. Tabulated Feature Vectors (TFVs)
Tabulated feature vector (TFV) extraction gets
around difficulties handling mixed and sparse data and
facilitates the use of statistical methods for log data. The
method proposed by Winding et al. [32], and further
applied in [3] takes log files and aggregates
observations. The resultant feature vector is a count of
occurrences of unique values and columns [32].
Figure 2 presents a conceptualization of the TFV
process. In Figure 2a a conceptual raw log file is shown
which include both categorical/text (Field A) and
numerical (Field B) data columns. The process to create
a TFV involves i) condensing text fields into columns of
unique counts, and ii) summations of the original
numerical values, which results in the TFV seen in
Figure 2b. Naturally, this method can be extended to
different fields, categories, etc., with the result being a
TFV of length dictated by the complexity of the log file.
The process in Figure 2 would result in one
observation, or row, if one applied it to an entire log file.
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Thus, the TFVs are most useful if they divide the log
files into blocks and then compute feature vectors for
each block. Notably, variables such as the number of
observations per block become important and one would
want to employ a trial and error approach to finding the
right number of samples per block. Whole log files can
be divided into blocks by specifying an amount of time
each block should represent or the number of
observations each block represents. Intuitively, this can
be accomplished using embedded analytics themselves.
Field A

Field B
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Z
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2
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2
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Z
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a) Example Raw Data

Process:
• Text fields have each unique
entry enumerated
• Numeric fields are summed
• Feature vector has columns for
each unique text field and each
enumerated column

•
•
•

data observations are placed into overlapping bins
based on a metric
clustering to group each bin
realizing a network with vertices (clusters) and
edges (intersections between clusters).
Data Set

Points in
common
=
Edges
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nodes

Figure 3. General Concept of TDA as implemented
in the Mapper algorithm, adapted from [34]
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b) Resultant Feature Vector

Figure 2. Generic feature vector creation process: (a)
raw data; (b) resultant feature vector, from [3]
As a representation of the approach, the example log
file under analysis was divided into 136 sequential time
blocks, which enabled each block to contain 289
observations. TFVs were then computed for each block
and the 9 data variables in Table 3 yielded 91 total
features, including the top 10 source and destination IPs.

3. Topological Data Analysis
Topological Data Analysis (TDA), conceptualized
in Figure 3, is a new unsupervised data mining approach
wherein clustering, dimensionality reduction, and
structure are considered together.
Through this
combination of methodologies, TDA provides
additional understanding of relationships within data, to
include both shape and similarity [11].
In TDA, one computes a topological model of the
data using various distance measures and lenses.
Practically, TDA extends upon this concept by binning
observations based on similarity and then clustered
based on shape and relationship. A graph-based
relationship is then computed to show relative similarity
between groupings of observations.
As a process and data mining approach, TDA
employs the concepts presented in the Mapper algorithm
[11] and is a generalization of hierarchical clustering
[33]. Considering the input data as a matrix, TDA
performs 3 steps via the Mapper algorithm [11]:

As an algorithm, Mapper considers the inputs X as
the data set, d as a metric on X, a scalar function f:X→
ℝ, and an overlapping interval covering (ai, bi) by f(X)
[11] [33]. The Mapper process considers a “preimage”
f- -1 (ai, bi) and then uses the selected distance metric, d,
to find pairwise distances between all observations [33],
step 1 of Figure 3. Hierarchical clustering [35] is then
performed to appropriately group points based on
distance and other hyperparameter selections [33], step
2 of Figure 3. Next, step 3 of Figure 3, a graph-based
topological model is constructed where vertices are
clusters and clusters can be connected by an edge if
these clusters share common observations.
The
Mapper
algorithm
has
multiple
hyperparameters, which are consistent with other
mapper implementations [33], these include:
• metrics, Table 1, the distance measure used for
pairwise distance between all observations
• lenses, Table 2, clustering approach employed
• resolution, the number of intervals the data is
portioned into
• gain, the number of edges in a network
• equalization, to ensure (or not) that all intervals
contain the same number of points [33].
Practically, increasing resolution creates a TDA model
with more nodes and increasing the gain increases the
number of edges in a TDA model [33]. For this TDA
application, the authors used the Ayasdi Workbench.
Table 1. General TDA Distance Metrics
Euclidean
Variance or IQR
Normalized Euclidean
Absolute, Norm, or
Distance Correlation
Manhattan

Cosine

Angle

Correlation

Norm Angle

Binary Jaccard

Haversine

Jaccard

Chebyshev
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Table 2. General TDA Lenses
Gaussian Density
Isomap
L1 Centrality
L-infinity centrality
Local Linear Embeddings

MDS
Metric PCA
Neighborhood Graph
Neighborhood
SVD

4. Combined Statistical and Graphical
Approach for Cyber Forensics
This work extends upon the work of [3] by
incorporating TDA into the embedded analytics
framework and also incorporating a feedback loop in the
analytics process. For the embedded analytics, R was
used, further illustrating the work of [36], which found
that open source digital forensics can be effective. In
operating embedded analytics apps, a cyber analyst can
use the general process in Figure 4 whereby the
preprocessing is automatically performed once a log file
is selected, as discussed in [3]. From there, an analyst
can use embedded applications to find blocks that have
anomalous behavior. This section reviews and explains
the process in Figure 4 and presents novel extensions of
both applying TDA for log analysis, in addition to
applying it in the analysis cycle of Figure 4 to enable
graphical, similarity-based analytics of logs in a
feedback approach in a larger analytics framework.
Preprocessing
Big Data
Platform

Block
Creation

State
Vector

Multicollinearity
Adjustment

Embedded Analytics
Graphical
IP
Network
Graph

Histogram
Matrix

Histogram

Feedback &
Queries

Factor
Analysis
Heatmap

TDA
Graphical
&
Similarity
Across-Blocks

Factor
Analysis
Scoreplot

Figure 4. Multivariate and Graphical Approach to
Firewall Log Anomaly Detection, extended from [3],
to include the feedback and TDA for log analysis

4.1. Preprocessing
Once log data is retrieved from the Big Data
Platform, pre-processing, including TFV creation, is of

interest prior to employing the analysis process. As
described in [3], preprocessing involves:
1. Dividing the log file into time-regional blocks
2. Creating tabulated state vectors
3. Performing data quality checks and adjustments for
multi-collinearity
Figure 5, from [3], shows an example of a block created
which consists of the categorical variables being labeled
as factors and the numerical variables being labeled as
numeric. In Figure 4, the counts are the number of levels
associated with a categorical variable then denote the
number of unique entries.
Block 14
289 Obs. Of 8 variables
transportProtocol: Factor w/ 4 levels “ICMP”, “No Protocol”, …: 2 2 2 2
bytesIn:
int
0
0
0
0
0
0…
bytesOut
:
int
0
0
0
0
0
0…
categoryOutcome
:
Factor w/ 4 levels “/Attempt”, “/Failure”, … : 4 4 4
Country_Name
:
Factor w/ 31 levels “Country 1”, “Country 2”, … : 31
Device_Name :
Factor w/ 19 levels “Device 1” , “Device 10”, … : 11 11
sourceAddress_mask :
Factor w/ 3376 levels “Source IP 1”, … :
2 22
destinationAddress_mask
:
Factor w/ 4786 levels “Destination IP 1”,…

Figure 5. Sample time block
One example can be seen in the 6th line of Figure 5,
Device_Name, which has 19 unique categories, or
levels, in the example log file. This indicates that logged
entries from 19 different devices were found in this log
file. These 19 devices will then become 19 different
columns in the tabulated state vectors, per Section 2.3.
Logged IP addresses are considered to only the top 10
observed IP addresses (both source and destination) and
the associated counts of these observed IP addresses are
recorded. These vectors are then aggregated into a single
matrix, the state vector matrix.
Before analytics are applied, the columns are
checked for multicollinearity which could result in
unreliable mathematical results. In this step, columns
with multicollinearity issues, e.g. matrix singularity,
rank deficiency, and strong correlation values, are
identified and removed [3].

4.2. Embedded Analytics
Once the data has been preprocessed, an analyst can
consider the embedded analytics suite and look for
anomalies, threats, and emerging behavior. For this
step, there are two general paths:
1) the Histogram Matrix (HMAT) that served as the
foundation of [3]
2) Topological Data Analysis (TDA) and its feedback
ability with HMAT, as proposed in this paper.
With these methods, HMAT is used to enable graphical,
within-blocks, and across-blocks analysis of blocks,
whereas TDA is used to look across blocks for similarity
and enable feedback and queries of blocks for HMAT
analysis. By incorporating TDA, embedded analytics
can be expanded to examine across the state matrix.

Page 1941

4.2.1. Histogram Matrix (HMAT). HMATs, a general
extension of heatmaps, are used consistent with [3]
where each cell’s value is a colorized circle with the
color representing one value and the size of the circle
representing another value. HMAT for cyber log files
visualize anomalies by coloring cells based on their
squared Mahalanobis distance, a general outlier
detection method, and provide an understanding of the
relative magnitude of the Mahalanobis distances based
on a scaling factor, the Breakdown Distance (BD) [3].

variable from the mean by their variance which thus
indicates the relative contribution of each variable to a
given MD score [3].
When considering the example dataset with HMAT,
one sees Figure 6. Here, block numbers (y-axis) and
column names (x-axis) are abstractly represented to
enable a big picture view to find potential anomalous
behavior. From these results, a user would select
specific blocks for further analysis. Briefly, one would
look for darker shaded circles, indicating a column in a
block contains anomalous behavior for this log file, and
then look at the size of the circles whereby larger circles
indicate that a given variable is increasing the MD for
that particular block. As discussed in [3], in Figure 6,
the clearest anomalies are blocks 14, 27, 44 and 63.
4.2.2. Within-Blocks Analytics. Within-blocks
analysis considers spillage of top attributes across
neighboring time blocks to understand how particular
columns are anomalous given the neighboring blocks.
For this approach, the top five columns are examined via
histograms to: 1) observe the data columns that cause
the block to be anomalous and 2) examine any regional
temporal relationship between the top five anomalous
columns and the neighboring time blocks [3]. The
example in Figure 6 shows Country 10 and Device 12
as appearing as anomalous only in Block 14; and Device
2 appearing only in Block 14 and adjacent blocks. Thus,
these features might indicate a particular event in or
around Block 14 associated with these attributes.

Figure 6. Histogram Matrix (HMAT)
HMAT for cyber log analysis uses the color to
represent the raw value of how anomalous a specific
column’s value is in a block, color determined from
Mahalanobis distances, and a further understanding of
the relative BD value, size of the circle. Mahalanobis
distance, a multivariate anomaly/outlier detection
method, compares each observation, x, via
(1)
𝑀𝐷 = √(𝑥 − 𝑥̅ )𝐶 −1 (𝑥 − 𝑥̅ )
with 𝑥 = (𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑝 ), a vector of p observations, 𝑥̅ =
(𝑥
̅̅̅,
𝑥𝑝 𝑎 the mean vector of the data, and 𝐶 −1
1 … , ̅̅̅),
being the inverse data covariance matrix [35]. Based on
their raw scores, MD values can be used to find
anomalies by relative magnitudes.
However, MD does not directly provide a rationale
for what is or is not an anomaly; thus, we proposed the
use of BD in [3], which is computed as,
(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥̅𝑖 )
(2)
𝐵𝐷𝑖 = |
|
√𝐶𝑖𝑖
where 𝑥𝑖 is a given variable, 𝑥̅𝑖 is the mean of the
variable, and 𝐶𝑖𝑖 is the variance of xi, which are the
diagonal values of C. BD scales the distance of each

Figure 6. Block 14 Within-Blocks Analysis with Top
5 Anomalous Columns per Breakdown Distance
4.2.3. Across-Blocks Analytics. Basic across blocks
analytics involves considering statistics for the entire
state vector matrix. For this PCA or FA are used to
aggregate data features and reduce dimensionality [3]
[35]. PCA is a linear transformation approach that
projects the original data by the eigenvectors of the data
covariance matrix to explain variation in the data; FA
extends upon PCA with a rotation, varimax used herein,
of retained components, to better represent the data [35].
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The dimensionality assessment process (number of
components to retain) used herein was Horn’s curve for
to select k unrotated (PCA) features and then Kaiser’s
Index of Factorial Simplicity was used to assess the
quality of the FA rotation [3]. When considering the
example state vector matrix through this process, the
dimensionality of columns is reduced from 91 variables
to 6 retained components/factors.

Figure 8. Factor plot using varimax rotated FA
scores and identified outlier blocks

Figure 7. Heatmap of Loadings Matrix from
Example Data with red = negative, blue = positive.
The result of across-blocks analytics is both a
heatmap of the loadings and x-vs-y factor plots. A
loadings heatmap, Figure 7, present a correlation matrix
of the original data and transformed factors to provide
an understanding of variable contributions to factors. As
an example analysis, factor 1 in Figure 7 shows that
devices and protocols were highly correlated with IP
addresses from Countries 16, 17, 18, and 29. From here,
analysts can incorporate contextual information, e.g.
possibly linking activity in this log file to known TOR
exit nodes. Further interpretation of Figure 7 shows a
possible connection between rules triggered in Device 4
and Device 13 and IPs from Countries 7 and 10, which
reinforces the interpretation of Figure 6 where Country
10 and Device 13 are seen active around Block 14.
Factor plots, Figure 8, consider the factor scores as
plotted in a pairwise manner for the 6 retained factors of
Figure 7. While the most variation is explained in
decreasing amount by each retained component/factor,
with this data, possible anomalous blocks are not
apparent until examining rotated scores 3 and 5 with
Based on Figure 8, potential anomalous time blocks, are
blocks 27, 63, 14 and 44. These can then be evaluated
further with HMAT, histograms, or graphical methods.

Figure 9. IP Network Graph of Block 14 with
detected port scan
4.2.4. Graphical Analytics. Graphical analysis of the
entire state matrix or a specific block are a further
direction to interpret a log file. IP network graphs, e.g.
Figure 9, visualize connections between source IP
addresses and the destination IP(s) within a dataset
allowing one to look for visual cues to understand
possible interactions and trends. While Figure 9 which
mostly shows singletons, i.e. single IP addresses, or
simple pairs, two groups are of interest, an encircled in
red. Both groups show clusters of source IP addresses
linking to multiple destination IP addresses. A top level
interpretation of these clusters is that a computer was
performing a port scan, possibly attempting to
fingerprint the network, and thus an analyst can revisit
this time block to understand this event further.
4.2.5. TDA for Graphical and Similarity AcrossBlocks Analytics. Missing in the process described
above, and in [3], is an understanding of similarity
across all blocks and feedback to repeatedly discover
and query. For example, the HMAT might indicate
which blocks have higher activity of Country 10, but not

Page 1943

what blocks are largely similar across this and all
columns. Additionally, with this information of
similarity, a user could select further blocks to refine
and redo the analysis discussed in 4.2.1-4.2.4.
Incorporating TDA can address both challenges.
TDA is performed on the entire state matrix of TFVs
and multiple topological models are constructed with
different combinations of lenses, metrics, resolutions,
and gains. One example topological model, which will
be discussed further, is presented in Figure 10a. Due to
the breadth of options for TDA, discussed in Section 3,
exhaustive combinations of metrics and lenses was not
considered. For the model in Figure 10a, a cosine metric
was used along with kurtosis and variance lenses.
Cosine distances can be useful because they are
translation variant but scale invariant, in contrast to
Euclidean distances [37].
In Figure 10 we see four groupings of nodes with
three of these groupings show connections, and thus
similarities, of nodes; the fourth grouping is of
singletons, which are not similar to other nodes based
on this selection of metrics and lenses. Coloring is also
possibly by the features used to generate the models,
with the default coloring (10a) being a divergent color
scheme (blue to red) based on block number (blue
representing mostly low numbered blocks and red
indicating a high concentration of higher numbered
blocks). In the middle grouping, we see a large
concentration of such dark red nodes in the middle and
then there is a gradient as one moves left or right across
this grouping.
Colored by Country 10 (Figure 10b), we see mostly
blue nodes, indicating few if any events from Country
10 except in the middle grouping which has high
concentrations of Country 10 activity on both the far
right and left ends. In part, Country 10 thus separates
this group from the rest of the groups. Revisiting Block
14, we find it in right most node of the middle grouping.
Colored by No Protocol (10c), we see the frequency
of No Protocol events. A general separation is seen for
all three groups and we can further investigates the FA
loadings plot of Figure 7. The upper grouping is largely
orange, indicating an average amount of No Protocol

a) Coloration by block number, with a
divergent color scheme (blue indicating
lower numbered, and red indicating
higher numbered, blocks)

events. The lower grouping is mostly yellow, green, and
blues; indicating few occurrence. However, the middle
grouping presents a color gradient that moves from
left to right in increasing No Protocol concentration.

4.3. Feedback with TDA
To further investigate what gathers together, we can
click on a node and then find what blocks it contains.
This functionality moves beyond capabilities available
in Ayasdi Workbench and incorporates its functionality
into the Big Data Platform. Here, we can enable analyst
driven feedback whereby analysts can take the
knowledge from the topological models and then
examine each node within this model with the HMAT
tool. From here, the process throughout Section 3 and 4
can be repeated to down-select blocks and find more
novelty and understanding of behaviors.
An example is presented in Figure 11. Here, HMATs
are presented for the three rightmost nodes of the middle
grouping. These HMATs now enable one to find
anomalies and trends within these subsets. Considering
the rightmost node in HMAT1 (bottommost HMAT in
Figure 11), which contains the Block 14 discussed
above, is found together with other potential blocks. Of
particular interest appears Block 48, which has high
levels of activity from Country 27, as well as the
adjacent Block 49, which also appears. A set of adjacent
blocks with strong anomalous scores also appears in the
next node, HMAT2 in the upper right of Figure 11,
which shares Blocks 48 and 49 with the rightmost node.
When we move over to the 3rd node from the right,
we see HMAT3 at the top left of Figure 11. Here, only
4 blocks are contained within this node. Most of these
blocks do not contain much anomalous activity, but
Block 16 appears to be active across most columns.
Since the other 3 blocks within this node are similar, we
might first investigate Block 16 and also look for
similar, but lower, activity in the Blocks 4, 37, and 127
which appear similar. Interestingly, HMAT 2 and
HMAT3 both overlap on Block 16, but Block 16 did not
appear notable in HMAT2. While Block 16 would have
likely been ignored just looking at the HMAT in Figure

b) Coloration by Country 10 with blue
colors representing low (or no) counts
and red colors indicating high counts.

c) Coloration by No Protocol with blue
colors representing low (or no) counts and
red colors indicating high counts.

Figure 10. Custom topological model using Metric: Cosine, Lens 1: Approximate Kurtosis, Lens 2:
Variance. Resolution: 30 (both lenses), gain: 2.50 (both lenses), with neither lens equalized.
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Figure 11. Topological Model from Figure 10a with incorporated HMAT visualizations for selected nodes.
6, the addition of TDA and feedback has enabled further
discovery of potentially interesting patterns.

5. Conclusions
The authors presented a systematic experiential and
data driven approach to cyber log analysis. For cyber log
analytics, the authors employed a tabulated feature
vector (TFV) approach which extracted numerical, and
non-sparse, data from sparse log files. With the TFVs,
the authors developed a human-machine approach that
was simultaneously temporal, similarity, and
statistically-based while also incorporating a feedback
mechanism.
This paper also provided the first
application of Topological Data Analysis (TDA) to log
analysis. In particular, it was seen that TDA enabled
one to look across all blocks to find similarity of events
for further interpretation. By enabling one to repeated
query the dataset through the feedback mechanism, the
authors showed how one can find anomalous behavior
to examine which would have been missed by
approaches in literature. Finally, this research illustrates
how to develop an embedded analytics approach for
anomaly detection, which is reproducible and
generalizable to other datasets, and other types of log
files, which have different data features.
Straightforward extensions include exploring the
application of the presented method to other types of log

files. Future work can also involve extending the TFV
process to include sparse data fields, which are currently
removed due to multicollinearity issues. Further future
work can consider further automation of the general
process in Figure 4 to bring human analysts; which
could be accomplished by automating the novelty
detection of TDA data products. Additional research can
involve TDA in general, including better understanding
the TDA hyperparameter space, comparison with other
clustering methods, and selecting appropriate analytics
given TDA outputs on the shape of the data.
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